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CRIMINAL LAW, MORAL THEORY, AND FEMINISM: SOME 
REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBJECT AND ON THE FUN (AND VALUE) 
OF COURTING CONTROVERSY 
JOSHUA DRESSLER* 
I am going to be a bit unfair.  The Saint Louis University Law Journal’s 
invitation to me to participate in this issue allows me the luxury of satisfying 
two goals.  The first is to take the opportunity, simply, to reflect (reminisce?) 
on slightly more than a quarter-century of teaching Criminal Law.  I love the 
subject and hope most professors of the course feel as I do, but most of all I 
hope my excitement for the subject, unabated after twenty-seven years, will 
spread to others, especially to young professors who by choice or decanal edict 
find themselves now or in the future teaching Criminal Law for the first time.1 
 
* Frank R. Strong Chair in Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University.  I 
appreciate helpful comments on an earlier draft by colleagues Kate Federle and Larry Herman.  I 
can be contacted at dressler.11@osu.edu. 
 1. I have taught criminal procedure courses during the same period, and love them as well.  
As I note in Part I infra, however, students are more easily attracted to criminal procedure than to 
its substantive cousin, and I have found during the years that many young professors who are 
inclined to teach in the criminal field have the same preference.  They ask to teach Criminal 
Procedure but sometimes have to be assigned to Criminal Law.  That bias is breaking down, in 
part I suspect because the constitutional law aspects of criminal procedure seem less exciting now 
than during the heady days of the Warren Court (and even in the post-Warren Court 1970s and 
early 1980s), and because a great deal is percolating through the substantive area as a result of 
challenges to the status quo brought by feminists and adherents of other critical intellectual 
movements. 
  There are other events that make substantive criminal law potentially more interesting to 
academics than in the past.  For example, the American Law Institute’s recent decision to develop 
new sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code (see AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING REPORT (2003)) has prompted interest in, and debate regarding, the creation of a 
Model Penal Code Second, which could reshape the criminal law.  See, e.g., Symposium, Model 
Penal Code Second: Good or Bad Idea?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 155, 155-244 (2003). 
  Also, lest I be misunderstood, I don’t consider substance and procedure dichotomous 
fields, even if the classes we teach sometimes give that impression.  For example, what is the 
subject of sentencing: substance or procedure?  Of course, it is both.  And nobody can truly 
appreciate the significance (and weaknesses) of the constitutional cases relating to the 
“procedural” issue of “burden of proof, without understanding “substantive” criminal law, the 
definitions of specific offenses, and the meaning of the concept of crime.”  E.g., Patterson v. New 
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (determining when a state may constitutionally allocate to the 
defendant the burden of persuasion regarding an issue properly before the fact-finder); Mullaney 
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My second goal (closer to the Law Journal’s wishes) is to describe the 
three Criminal Law classes (or, more accurately, topics) I most enjoy teaching 
and, in the process, offer a few hopefully useful pedagogical suggestions.  
When I pondered this aspect of the essay and made my subject matter choices, 
I noticed certain commonalities: (1) two of the topics allow me to sensitize my 
students to moral theories of criminal responsibility and punishment, and to 
show even the most pragmatic of my students why they should care about 
these theories;2 (2) they are all hot-button topics that regularly get students 
excited and agitated; (3) relatedly, all three topics involve feminist challenges 
to prevailing (or once prevailing) law, and (4) although I am sympathetic to 
many feminist goals, I disagree in part with feminist critiques in these areas 
and I enjoy expressing those doubts in class. 
In short, the topics I most like covering are those that invite students to 
become agitated, to become passionate, and to “get it on” with me.  On 
reflection, I guess my preference for stirring things up should not surprise me.  
I will not bore you with my background, at least not in the text of this essay.3  
 
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (same).  Moreover, changes in “procedural” rules inevitably 
affect “substance” and vice-versa.  If a legislature may not criminalize vagrancy, see Papachristou 
v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), declaring a vagrancy ordinance violative of the due process 
clause, you can expect that the police will be given greater authority to detain persons short of 
arrest to accomplish the same result.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing brief 
detentions of persons when officers reasonably suspect that crime is afoot, even when there are 
insufficient grounds for arrest). 
 2. I vividly remember the day a student came up just before class and asked me, 
contemptuously, why I was wasting his time discussing moral theories relating to concepts of 
justification and excuse.  Despite my consternation (is that a great way to start class, or what?), I 
tried to give him a brief explanation.  He stopped me midstream, did an abrupt about-face to 
return to his seat (at least he didn’t walk out), and expressed under his breath (but I assume also 
for my edification), “If I wanted a philosophy class, I would have gone for my Ph.D.”  By the 
way, that remark came from a student at an elite (supposed Top Ten) law school.  Although my 
experience suggests that the stereotype is generally true—the more elite the law school, the more 
willing or even anxious students are to discuss theory—I have also learned that narrow-minded 
students are found at all law schools, and that students anxious to broaden their horizons are also 
found everywhere. 
 3. If your eyes dropped to this footnote, I can bore you (briefly) here.  My parents were 
fellow travelers of fellow travelers of the Left during the Depression, my criminologist father 
earned the wrath of J. Edgar Hoover in the 1950s (I am not quite sure why) and was a vocal 
advocate of prison reform in the 1960s (not insignificant because he had been Chief of Parole for 
the State of New York in an earlier period), and all of this rubbed off on me.  I resolutely (but 
quietly) refused to salute the flag in my junior and senior high school classes, and I was a 
Conscientious Objector during the Vietnam War.  But, even during this period, I was 
uncomfortable with the intellectual rigidity of many of my New Left colleagues, and my tolerance 
for rigidity has grown thinner as I have grown older (and, uh, less thin).  Indeed, I am never more 
pleased than when one of my seminar students tells me that her views on a criminal law topic 
have changed 180 degrees (and, I really don’t care which direction that puts her) as a result of 
researching and thinking about her paper topic.  My views on criminal law issues, too, have 
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It is enough to say here that what makes teaching Criminal Law so much fun 
for me, and I am sure for so many other veterans in the classroom, is the 
chance to get students immersed in thinking about—and, hopefully, tackling 
on a more-than-shallow level—some of the most provocative issues they will 
confront in law school, while simultaneously learning some law. 
I will keep my personal thoughts about Criminal Law (Part I) relatively 
brief.  In Part II, I provide an overview to my teaching strategy in my Criminal 
Law class.  I then describe my favorite classes (Parts III through V) and, in the 
process, hopefully provide some useful pedagogical advice. 
I.  REMINISCING, ADVISING, AND A LITTLE CHEERLEADING 
I have taught Criminal Law in twenty-six of my twenty-seven years of full-
time teaching at nine law schools (either as a visitor or tenure-track professor) 
in five states and one Canadian province.4  In some schools, Criminal Law has 
been a first-semester first-year class, in others a second-semester first-year 
course.5  In most schools I taught a three-credit version of the subject; in a few 
I have had the “luxury” of four credits.  I suppose like most 1L professors, I 
prefer teaching students in their first semester, when they are most excited and 
 
changed during the years, sometimes requiring me to concede error (or, at least, change of heart) 
in subsequent scholarship.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying 
the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1361 n.175 (1989); 
Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 959, 962 (2002) [hereinafter Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?]. 
 4. I have taught Criminal Law in California (McGeorge School of Law, University of the 
Pacific, and two University of California branches [Berkeley and Los Angeles]), Minnesota 
(Hamline University), Michigan (Wayne State University and the University of Michigan), and 
Ohio (Ohio State University).  I have taught other criminal-related classes at University of 
California, Davis, University of Iowa, and University of British Columbia (as part of a summer 
program run by Southwestern University). 
 5. Which semester is better?  From a curricular perspective, I think the case for teaching 
Criminal Law in the fall is strong.  First, it is valuable for students to take a public law course at 
the start of their law school career, especially because they are otherwise inundated with private 
law subjects in the traditional first-year curriculum.  Second, for students who are already 
oriented toward public law when they enter, Criminal Law gives them a tid-bit early on, while 
their excitement with law school is likely to be at its zenith.  Third, Criminal Law might be the 
best first-year substantive class for teaching students statutory analysis (through the use all 
semester of the Model Penal Code found in almost every criminal law casebook, or with 
supplementary materials linked to some actual state criminal code) along with the common-law 
materials they will learn in all of their 1L courses.  Fourth, probably better than any other first-
year course (except where Jurisprudence might be taught in the 1L curriculum), Criminal Law 
familiarizes students with broad jurisprudential issues that any educated lawyer will confront in 
her career.  Finally, the fact patterns are usually (and, perhaps unfortunately) within the common 
experience of most students or, at least, are familiar to them through the media and other cultural 
venues. 
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idealistic,6 although I am always struck by how much slower I must proceed, 
and thus how much less I can cover, during the fall semester because of student 
inexperience with the case method of learning.7 
As a student at the University of California-Los Angeles, I learned 
Criminal Law with the Kadish and Paulsen casebook, so I began teaching my 
class as well with the Kadish and Schulhofer casebook.8  I think most 
professors would agree that it is the classic in the field.  Few casebooks 
influence the way lawyers or scholars think about a subject, but this book 
qualifies in that regard.9  I enjoyed teaching from it, but I found from student 
evaluation forms that students were less happy with it than I was.  In 1992 or 
1993, I began teaching in part from my own materials, and in 1994 those 
materials became my own casebook.10  Although I no longer teach from 
 
 6. I find student morale—and, thus, class participation—erodes appreciably in the second 
semester, when grades from the fall semester are distributed and the ninety percent of the class 
that expected to be in the top ten percent, but are not, rethink their position.  And, of course, a 
certain level of fatigue sets in for everyone in the second semester, regardless of class rank.  It is 
as if the intellectual adrenaline tank is now at one-quarter level, and students are pacing 
themselves, as they know they must be mentally prepared for final exams.  Also, at least in my 
experience, it seems that law schools often give 1L students a heavier load in their second 
semester—an extra unit or two, or more time-consuming work in legal writing than they had in 
their first semester.  This factor alone cuts into student time for class preparation and energy. 
 7. In my teaching experience, the four-unit version of Criminal Law has always been a fall 
semester phenomenon.  I cover only slightly more material in those four units in the fall than I 
can cover in three units in the spring, all else equal.  Needless to say, a three-unit fall class allows 
a teacher very little opportunity to give her students either the breadth or depth of coverage she 
desires or requires. 
 8. The first edition of the casebook, Criminal Law and Its Processes, published in 1962, 
actually was the Paulsen and Kadish casebook, with then co-author Monrad G. Paulsen listed 
first.  The names were reversed for the second edition, by the time I took Criminal Law in 1970.  
Upon Professor Paulsen’s death, Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer joined the casebook on the 
fourth edition in 1983.  It is now in its seventh excellent edition, published in 2001. 
 9. Perhaps (as my colleague Kate Federle suggests) the following point deserves more than 
a footnote: It is not simply, or even primarily, casebooks that shape the way lawyers and scholars 
think about the law; it is the classroom professor who is the greatest influence.  By our selection 
of casebooks, by our decisions on what cases to cover and which ones to omit, and most of all by 
the particular ways in which we ask our students to think about the cases, we are shaping our 
students’ thought processes and, whether by choice or not, their ideas about the law. 
  This is not to say that our students arrive in a tabula rasa state.  Far from it.  And, in any 
intellectually diverse classroom, these students’ ideas and prior experiences will also help shape 
the learning process.  Nonetheless, the teacher directs the classroom discourse, brings her or his 
expertise to the conversations, and, simply by these facts alone, has a disproportionate influence 
on students’ thinking about the more subtle aspects of the law.  That is why teaching—in law 
school, yes, but even more so in the elementary, secondary, and undergraduate phases—is such 
an exhilarating—and yet hopefully humbling—experience. 
 10. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (1994).  The casebook 
is now in its third edition. 
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Kadish and Schulhofer, as my casebook preface indicates, I am indebted to 
their book.11 
Students at every law school at which I have taught have found Criminal 
Procedure—specifically the police practices version of the course—their 
favorite criminal justice course (and, often, their favorite class in law school 
generally).  Most students come into that class ready to enjoy it—after all, it is 
cops and robbers, NYPD Blue, and Law and Order for three units.  I have 
found that most students do not come into Criminal Law with this same 
positive attitude.12  And yet, it is this course that I most love to teach. 
I am irked that many law faculties have historically treated Criminal Law 
with relatively little respect.  In the not-too-distant past, Torts, Contracts, Civil 
Procedure, and even Property were accorded five or six first-year credits while 
Criminal Law, if a first-year class at all, received three units.  What does this 
tell new students?  Seemingly the message is that these other subjects are twice 
as important (and what does this say about the public versus private law 
dichotomy?), or that they are twice as difficult,13 or perhaps that there is twice 
as much law to learn in those subjects.  Of course, none of this is true, but the 
fact remains that criminal law historically has been viewed as the “grubby” 
area of the law that true “gentlemen” did not aspire to practice.  And yet, it is 
Criminal Law that probably best teaches 1Ls the critically important skill of 
statutory analysis, and I don’t think there is a better basic substantive course 
for familiarizing students with political, moral, and legal theory.14 
 
 11. Id. at ix (“With the publication of my own casebook comes my professional bar mitzvah, 
but I can think of no higher accolade than if someone were to say of this book, ‘Why, it is a son-
of-Kadish (and Schulhofer).’”). 
 12. This attitude is not peculiar to my experience, nor is it just a recent phenomenon.  See 
Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, Address at the Eighteenth 
Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar Lecture (May 13, 1980), in 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 
(1980) (responding, through fictional dialogue, to criticisms of the course and subject matter 
expressed by students to the author over many years). 
  My colleague Larry Herman suggests another reason for students’ (and his own) 
preference for Criminal Procedure.  At least as to the police practice version of the class, it 
primarily involves a single system (federal constitutional restraints) over which a single court 
(United States Supreme Court) ultimately presides.  As Larry has put it to me, “it is fun to 
observe and analyze the progression (or retrogression) of cases.  By contrast Criminal Law is 
unwieldy—one case from California, another from Pennsylvania, a third from New York.” 
 13. I remember a comment from a former colleague of mine—a former civil practitioner—
unfortunately made only partly in jest: “You don’t even need three units.  Just tell your students 
that they are lucky that states now have a penal code, and point them to it.  What is so difficult to 
understand about the criminal law?”  I told my colleague, not in jest, that I hoped nobody would 
ever ask him to teach Criminal Law or, worse, come to him needing advice on a criminal law 
matter.  As he was a tenured member of the faculty, and I was not at the time, I smiled as I said it.  
Inside, I was steaming. 
 14. See supra note 5. 
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The curricular bias against Criminal Law persists today, although less so 
than when I started teaching.  A substantial minority of law schools now 
allocates four credits for the course.  I suppose I should not incite rebellion, but 
I urge those of you required to teach Criminal Law in a three-unit version to try 
to raise your faculty’s openness to the idea of adding one unit to the course.15 
As I say, many of my Criminal Law students do not come to the class 
expecting to be excited, even though (or is it because?) it involves the rawest 
material—for example, cannibalism,16 euthanasia,17 rape, tragic abuse of 
 
 15. As any veteran of the curricular wars knows, it is extremely difficult to make changes in 
the first-year law school curriculum.  Adding one unit to one subject will usually require taking 
away a credit from another subject, and my experience is that it is a rare professor willing to say 
that her subject should be the one sacrificed.  Thus, changes of the sort I am suggesting typically 
occur as part of broader first-year curricular reform, perhaps by removal of credits from all of the 
other first-year classes, the addition of a fourth unit to Criminal Law, and the inclusion of another 
class (for example, a course in professional ethics, statutory interpretation, or jurisprudence) in 
the first-year menu. 
  As hard as the process of getting a four-credit Criminal Law class might be, it is not 
insurmountable, as evidenced by the trend toward four credits.  If you are inclined to make the 
effort, I have a few suggestions.  First, of course, get together with the other criminal law 
professors to be sure you are (or can come to be) on the same wavelength.  If you folks don’t 
agree, you can hardly expect support from the faculty. 
  Second, develop the arguments for the additional unit that seem most persuasive given 
your law school’s situation.  One law school I know had an historically strong “private law” bias 
that newer faculty, including a fair number of non-criminal law professors and the dean, wanted 
to reverse.  Thus, the public law versus private law argument had the potential to convince some 
persons, even some 1L professors “negatively” affected, to support change.  Another law school 
might find arguments based on the job market—job availability in the criminal law area—to 
support more emphasis on criminal law classes.  And so on. 
  Third, don’t just come to the appropriate academic committee requesting an additional 
unit.  Provide some alternative models of how this change can be fit into the 1L schedule.  Can 
the extra unit be added without taking away from others, or will this extra credit put too much of 
a load on your students?  If the unit added requires a unit taken away, how will you handle this 
problem?  Perhaps you know that there are some 1L professors who have agitated for other types 
of first-year reform, who could join you in support of the additional unit because it would be part 
of some larger reform. 
  Warning: If prior experience is any indication, if you succeed in getting the extra unit, 
Criminal Law will be placed (if it was not already there) in the fall semester.  As I have 
mentioned, see supra note 7, a four-unit fall version of Criminal Law provides only minimal 
space for additional coverage, if you are currently teaching the three-unit version in the spring.  I 
still think the change is worth the effort because you get students with a more positive attitude to 
learning, you do get to cover a little more material (or go deeper into the same material), and your 
law school will be sending a valuable message about the importance of the subject and public law 
generally.  (Of course, if you currently teach Criminal Law as a three-unit fall class, the added 
unit will be a true blessing.) 
 16. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). 
 17. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). 
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children,18 and the like—they will read in their law school careers.  But, as I 
tell my students on the first day, what is so special about Criminal Law is not 
simply that it involves, literally, life-and-death issues, but that it is a course 
where they will have the opportunity to reflect on the truly Big Questions—the 
questions that not only lawyers, but also theologians, poets, geneticists, social 
scientists, and just plain folk, have been contemplating for centuries.  It is 
Criminal Law, after all, where students consider issues of right and wrong, as 
well as matters of personal and social responsibility for wrongful conduct.  It is 
Criminal Law that asks such questions as: What types of conduct merit 
enforcement through the criminal law?  When is the infliction of pain through 
punishment justifiable?  When is it just to hold a person legally accountable for 
the actions of another?  When is intentionally taking human life proper, or at 
least tolerable, and why?  When should people be free from moral censure for 
concededly wrongful conduct?  At what point is it proper for society to 
intervene and punish for inchoate conduct?  Free will versus determinism.  
Feminism versus multiculturalism.  Retributivism versus utilitarianism.  Rawls 
versus Hobbes.  And so on, and on and on.  So many old and contemporary 
conflicts. 
This is a great subject!  I feel blessed that I have been able to teach it for 
so many years.  For those of you who are at the early stages of your Criminal 
Law journey, treasure the opportunity. 
II.  MY CLASS GOALS 
Students sometimes complain that I try to do too much in my Criminal 
Law class.  If you glance at the preface to the first edition of my casebook, you 
will see the basis for their complaints.  I state there what I think matters: 
doctrine, penal theory, appreciating the relevance of other disciplines in 
formulating sensible criminal laws, statutory analysis, and “thoughtful, wide-
 
 18. As an author looking for pedagogically useful cases to include in a casebook, I have read 
more child abuse (and child homicide) cases than I ever expected or wanted to.  Those were the 
cases that I found emotionally hardest to stomach; some of the cases I read brought me to tears, 
and I omitted the use of some otherwise pedagogically useful child abuse cases because the facts 
left me up at night.  Nonetheless, some such cases made it into my casebook.  E.g., Oxendine v. 
State, 528 A.2d 870 (Del. 1987) (in which the court reports that the homicide victim, a six-year-
old boy, was heard by a neighbor crying, “Please stop, Daddy, it hurts”).  I continue to receive 
unsolicited comments from some casebook users suggesting I omit these cases.  The problem, of 
course, is that any class covering Criminal Law is replete with awful crimes, so there is no 
sensible way to protect readers from this reality, nor should we.  To the extent that some students 
dislike Criminal Law because of the ugliness of the cases, I understand their feelings even as I 
compel them to confront them, as lawyers must do.  Nonetheless, we need to be especially 
sensitive to the possibility, even probability over time, that we will have students who, as a result 
of being direct or indirect crime victims, will become overwrought (what if they are survivors of 
child abuse?) by some of the cases in the class.  See infra note 67. 
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open, and relevant” discussion of controversial topics.19  You cannot do all of 
this, all of the time, but I try to do a lot of it, much of the time.  I urge you to 
do the same, although each of us must choose her or his own weighting of 
these elements, depending on scholarly interests, student abilities, and 
pedagogical philosophy. 
There is never enough time in any class, and especially Criminal Law 
(even in the four-unit version), to teach everything that is found in any 
casebook.  Choices must be made, and I always find those choices painful, 
somewhat like deciding which of my children to pay attention to and which 
ones to ignore.20  In terms of coverage, like most professors and casebooks, I 
emphasize the general part of the criminal law, that is, the basic doctrines that 
apply regardless of the crime.  As for the special part, the only completed 
offenses I emphasize are murder, manslaughter and rape, although students 
will certainly learn the definitions, without the complexities, of other major 
offenses along the way.21 
Teachers of 1L courses know that a primary goal of any first-year class is 
to teach lawyering skills (“thinking like a lawyer”).  This means that we cannot 
teach as much doctrine in the first year as in an equivalent upper-division 
course.  And, because doctrine changes over time, no law school course should 
ever be focused too much on these basics.  That being said, I want my students 
to leave my classroom with a reasonable grounding in doctrine.  Indeed—and 
here is where students start to complain—I warn students on day one that they 
will be held responsible for two sets of doctrine, the common law and the 
Model Penal Code, the former because the roots of our penal law come from it, 
and the latter because it is a wonderful tool for critiquing the common law, for 
seeing where modern law is moving, and for helping students learn skills of 
 
 19. DRESSLER, supra note 10, at v-vi. 
 20. As a casebook author, I need to experience my entire casebook in the classroom, so I 
teach every page of my casebook during a four-year period.  I cover some topics every year (for 
example, basic theories of punishment, voluntary act and omission requirements, basic mens rea 
concepts, mistake of fact and law, causation, criminal homicide, rape, self-defense, necessity, 
duress, insanity, criminal attempts, and accomplice liability), although not necessarily every case 
in my book relating to the topic, and then I cover the omitted materials rotationally during the 
four years, making room when needed by skipping a little of the previously mentioned materials.  
Of course, you can decide “permanently” to skip materials you find less interesting or important, 
but there is something to be said, if only to avoid intellectual stagnation, with varying your 
syllabus this way, over time. 
 21. Professor Douglas Husak has written that criminal theorists spend too little time 
attempting to develop a theory of criminalization that could help reverse the exponential increase 
in the number of criminal statutes in the United States.  Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law 
Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261 (2003).  In personal conversations with me, he has 
criticized many casebooks, including my own, for failing to focus on the criminalization issue, 
and especially for ignoring drug offenses, which are a far greater real-world factor in the criminal 
justice system than any of the offenses we teach. 
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statutory interpretation.  As much as I care about theory, I am sufficiently 
grounded in the real world that I want students to have the opportunity, if they 
work at it, of leaving my class with enough basic substantive knowledge that if 
they choose to practice criminal law, they can say that at least some of the 
substantive law they confront daily looks at least a little bit familiar. 
I also want my students to leave class prepared to be policy-makers, 
whether this occurs in the courtroom, in government, or simply as opinion-
makers in their community.  This means that I want them to have the tools to 
thoughtfully critique the criminal law.  I believe that students ought to be 
steeped in retributive and utilitarian theory so they can test every doctrine they 
study against these penal theories.  I tell my class in the first week that the 
theories of punishment are the most important tools they will use all semester.  
If a rule is not defensible under either theory, this should trigger concern on 
their part.  If a doctrine is only defensible under retributive theory, for 
example, but is being rationalized by courts or legislators on utilitarian 
grounds, bells should go off.  If a particular criminal law doctrine is only 
justifiable under one penal theory but interrelated doctrines are founded on the 
other penal theory, they should worry that lawmakers might have developed a 
self-defeating set of principles. 
In my classes, almost all of the doctrinal analysis during the semester is 
done through the dual lenses of retributivism and utilitarianism, although 
sometimes we turn to political theory as well.22  I also make a few other 
overarching points during the semester, one of the most important of which is 
this descriptive one: Although the criminal law does not seek to punish 
everything that is considered immoral (thank goodness), and not everything 
that is punishable involves morally wrongful conduct (perhaps unfortunately), 
a criminal code is as close as we come in our secular legal system to a moral 
code.  The criminal trial, therefore, is something of a morality play.  This 
means that as long as this description remains relatively accurate and we don’t 
seek to separate the criminal law from moral considerations, we should care 
about whether the penal code accurately expresses society’s moral sense.  In 
turn, this means that lawmakers and lawyers—and students—should care about 
moral theories; and as lawyers we need to use the tools of our profession—
words—with care so that moral judgments are expressed accurately.23  This 
 
 22. Of course, as I proceed I add more than a few comments on the need for realism about 
what actually occurs in legislative halls and courtrooms.  I find, however, that students usually 
come to law school well-equipped with skeptical, even cynical, views about the law and law-
making, so I do not need to feed them too much of this.  In any case, I want them to retain at least 
a little idealism by suggesting that moral theories and principled analysis of the law matter or, at 
least, should matter. 
 23. For example, lawyers should appreciate the distinction between saying that a homicide is 
“justifiable” (proper, good, or, at least, tolerable) or that it is “excusable” (the homicide is wrong, 
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also means that those concerned about the criminal law should be cognizant of 
matters that might affect moral judgments, including what the “hard” and 
“soft” sciences might teach about human conduct, what literature explicates, 
and what history might inform us about the human condition.  Of course, a law 
class cannot be all things to all people, but I want students to appreciate the 
interdisciplinary nature of the enterprise, and to come to the issues of criminal 
law with appropriate humility. 
III.  THE PROVOCATION CASES 
I love teaching (and writing24) about provocation.  For me, there are two 
great pedagogical aspects to the topic: It is my first opportunity to sensitize 
students to the difference between justification and excuse defenses, a matter 
of importance in my classroom, and second, this is the first (but hardly last) 
time I bring feminist considerations to the classroom.25 
A. Justification versus Excuse: The First Experience 
Although there are not perfectly clear lines between justification and 
excuse defenses,26 most lawyers, courts, and casebooks make too little of the 
difference.27  My students are cognizant of the distinction by the end of the 
semester.28  I want students to appreciate the importance of distinguishing 
 
but the actor is morally blameless for causing it).  Although it is a bit too simplistic to put it this 
way, “justifications” focus on the act, and “excuses” focus on the actor. 
 24. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a 
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982); Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial 
Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467 (1988); Joshua Dressler, When 
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual 
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995); 
Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 3. 
 25. I typically spend two to two and one-half sessions on provocation, divided into three 
segments: (a) teaching the common law basics and discussing the rationale of the defense; (b) 
focusing on the objective standard of the doctrine, i.e., determining who or what constitutes the 
“reasonable” or “ordinary” person who is provoked, and (c) covering the expanded and 
controversial Model Penal Code version of the defense, which nicely leads into arguments for 
outright abolition of the defense. 
 26. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1897 (1984); see also Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in 
the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 
(1984). 
 27. I have previously provided examples of the legal profession’s failures in this regard.  
Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 
33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1160-61 (1987).  There is somewhat greater attention to the distinction 
today, at least in various casebooks. 
 28. I jokingly tell students that they will be dreaming—having nightmares?—about the 
concepts by the end of the semester.  In fact, I expect students to use the words “justification” and 
“excuse” correctly by the end of the year, and almost all do. 
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between (as I put it in class) “J” and “E” as a means of sending accurate moral 
messages.29  I also want them to see that this distinction can have practical 
legal significance to a trial lawyer.  Students will immerse themselves in this 
distinction later in the semester, but I give them a taste of it here, early on. 
It almost doesn’t matter with what case you begin, but I start the 
provocation materials with what might be characterized as a typical case: a 
male killing a female in an alleged provocation as the result of a domestic 
dispute.  I use Girouard v. State,30 a case in which the defendant’s wife, after 
just a few months of marriage, told her husband that she no longer loved him 
and, after being questioned by the defendant about this, jumped on his back on 
the bed, pulled his hair, and taunted him (“What are you going to do, hit me?” 
and “I never did want to marry you and you are a lousy fuck and you remind 
me of my dad [whom she despised for impregnating her]”).31  A few moments 
later, the defendant entered the kitchen, obtained a kitchen knife, returned to 
his wife, and after she verbally provoked him further, he stabbed her to death 
and then slit his own wrists.32 
After developing the basic principles of the defense—most notably that the 
defense only applies if there is adequate provocation (emphasis on “adequate”) 
and insufficient cooling-off time—I ask the obvious question: Why is an 
intentional killing ever reduced to manslaughter?  By now students have 
learned that many state criminal codes divide murder into degrees and that a 
sudden-provoked killing will typically reduce the offense from first-degree to 
second-degree murder, but why as a policy matter should it be reduced further 
to “mere” manslaughter?  Why should the law “reward” persons for “failing to 
keep their cool?,” I ask. 
This line of questioning and the facts of Girouard allow me to begin 
developing the competing views of the defense.  I provocatively (no pun 
intended) ask students, for example, whether victim Joyce Girouard “asked for 
it” by her conduct.  Some students understandably object to this 
characterization, but I “defend” my position by reminding students of trial 
testimony, reported in the appellate opinion, by a psychologist that Joyce had a 
“‘compulsive need to provoke jealousy.’”33 
The point of this discussion is to show students that, at least subliminally, 
the defense might be based in part on the principle that the victim partially (it 
is, after all, only a partial defense, in that it only results in mitigation of guilt 
and not full exculpation) deserved to die, that her (and so often, it is a female 
who is killed) actions invited this response, that her death does not constitute 
 
 29. For the most basic distinction, see supra note 23. 
 30. 583 A.2d 718 (Md. 1991). 
 31. Id. at 719. 
 32. Id. at 720. 
 33. Id. 
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the same level of social harm as the death of an “innocent” person.  In short, 
this interpretation suggests that provocation is a partial justification for a 
homicide.  This characterization upsets many students, which is my purpose.  
This leads me simultaneously in two directions: to see if the class can develop 
an alternative and better explanation for the provocation doctrine, and to 
consider criticisms, particularly of a feminist nature, of the defense.34 
If the discussion has focused too much on the justification side of the 
defense line, I ask: “If the rationale of the defense is that the victim partially 
deserved to die, then why is there a requirement that the defendant act in a 
state of passion, that he not have had time to cool off?”  This question 
demonstrates that there is a potential excusatory explanation of the defense, 
i.e., the fact that the defense involves “heat of passion” shows that the defense 
focuses, at least in part, on the defendant’s emotional condition, which is a 
feature of excuse defenses. 
Of course, at this stage of the semester, the concepts of “justification” and 
“excuse” are foreign to the students, so this is why I lay out the 
justification/excuse distinction at this point (promising them a lot more is 
coming),35 and I let students see how the defense can potentially be explained 
on either ground as, hopefully, class discussion has shown by now, albeit 
probably without use of these magic “J” and “E” terms. 
It is here that I can develop the two justification/excuse points I try to 
make during the semester—the importance of sending the proper moral 
message and the practical significance to lawyers of the distinction.  I want 
students beginning to think about the possibility that the claim that a provoker 
deserves, even partially, to die for her misbehavior is far more morally 
troubling than the excuse-based claim that, all else equal, a person who is 
seriously provoked to kill is less blameworthy because of an understandable 
loss of self-control than one who kills calmly. 
I can make this argument fairly persuasively, and simultaneously show 
students the practical significance of the defense, by using a hypothetical, 
which is a variation on the facts in Regina v. Scriva:36 Father (F) and Daughter 
(D) are walking along the side of a rural road.  F observes a car, driven by S, 
approaching and veering unsafely.  F moves D further to the side but before he 
can protect her, S (who is drunk) runs over and kills D with his car.  S’s car 
runs into a tree, immobilizing him.  F, enraged and grief-stricken, pulls a knife 
from his jacket and moves toward the car with the intention of stabbing S.  As 
 
 34. I hold off much of the outright critique of the defense to the next class session.  See 
supra note 25. 
 35. My casebook includes a brief explanation of the justification/excuse distinction in the 
provocation context, but a professor can simply lecture briefly on the point, if needed.  JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 264-67 (3d ed. 2003). 
 36. [No 2] (1951) 1951 V.L.R. 298. 
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he does this, Bystander (B), who observed all of the preceding events, 
intercedes to prevent the stabbing.  F intentionally stabs B to death. 
F is prosecuted for murder of B but wishes to claim he is guilty only of 
heat-of-passion manslaughter.  In Scriva, on roughly these facts, the issue was 
whether this defense could be raised, i.e., whether the jury should be instructed 
on provocation.  I ask students to articulate the arguments they would make to 
the judge to permit, and alternatively to refuse, a provocation instruction.  It is 
wonderful here to see the light bulbs go on above the heads of so many 
students.  If the earlier justification/excuse discussion seemed a bit too abstract 
for some, now it is clearer.  They see that there is no plausible way to argue 
that B’s death was even partially justified, but students typically feel 
compassion for F and understand how he could have been in such a state of 
grief that he could not control himself when B stood between him and the killer 
of his daughter.  Students can appreciate how his level of self-control would be 
undermined in a way that might make him less blameworthy than the usual 
intentional killer.  Thus, simultaneously, students see how the 
justification/excuse distinction has practical significance (a jury instruction on 
manslaughter should be given if, but only if, the defense is a partial excuse), 
and they see from an overarching policy perspective how the provocation 
defense can more easily be accepted if it is understood in excusing, not 
justificatory, terms. 
Typically, I succeed in getting the justification/excuse concepts in the 
students’ minds.  When I return to these concepts later in the semester, students 
have the provocation discussion, including the importance of drawing 
distinctions, fairly well-etched in their minds. 
B. The Feminist Critique 
The preceding Scriva hypothetical somewhat blunts the feminist critique of 
the provocation defense, but I don’t want students to get too far from the 
criticism, for it is an important one.  As feminists have pointed out, most users 
of the defense apparently are men, and a disproportionate number of the 
victims in provocation cases are females37 or a male killed because of his 
conduct in relation to a “significant female” (for example, a wife, girlfriend, 
sister, or daughter) of the provoked killer.  Thus, to many feminists, the 
defense is not much more than an unjustified testosterone-inspired defense that 
promotes or, at least, partially condones, male violence in response to personal 
loss and insults to their pride. 
I think the best way to get students focused on the feminist critique is to 
move beyond Girouard (although it nicely makes the point) and consider the 
Model Penal Code’s even more expansive “extreme mental or emotional 
 
 37. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1335 (1997). 
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disturbance” defense.38  People v. Casassa39 nicely gets us back on message 
(or issue, at least): Casassa brutally killed Victoria Lo Consolo for no better 
reason than that she spurned his affection.40  The proverbial final straw 
occurred when she rejected a gift he offered her.41  The case is unfortunate 
from one pedagogical perspective: The defendant’s claim seems more properly 
characterized as diminished capacity than provocation.42  But, the fact that the 
Model Penal Code would allow the defense to be raised (to become a jury 
issue) in a case like this—where the “provocation” is nothing more than a 
female’s legitimate desire to make clear to the defendant that she does not want 
a relationship with him—clearly focuses attention on the controversial nature 
of the defense.  It is here that I bring to the students’ attention the findings of 
Professor Victoria Nourse that the Model Penal Code version of the defense is 
often used by a man who has killed in response to nothing more than legitimate 
efforts at separation by his female victim.43  Although Nourse does not use 
these findings to argue for outright abolition of the provocation defense, I want 
students to seriously consider such a possibility, even though it is one I 
ultimately reject in my own scholarship.44 
Class discussion usually is very good.  Critics of the defense, either from a 
feminist or law enforcement perspective, typically make utilitarian arguments 
for its abolition; defenders of the provocation doctrine usually provide 
retributive just-deserts, excuse-based arguments.  Students, therefore, see how 
these competing theories of punishment inform their discussion.  Student 
comments also tend to touch upon nature-or-nurture ideas: do men primarily 
turn to violence, whereas women do not, because of testosterone (in which 
case it might be unfair to ignore the biological explanations for the conduct), or 
is it because our culture promotes male violence (in which case we might want 
to abolish the defense to promote a different value system)? 
I never feel we have enough time for the provocation defense.  But, I 
justify (not excuse) the time I give it because it is a wonderful opening for 
what is to come, both in terms of justification and excuse discussion and 
feminist criticisms of prevailing law. 
 
 38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985). 
 39. 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980). 
 40. Id. at 1312. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 3, at 987–89. 
 43. Nourse, supra note 37, at 1342–51. 
 44. Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 3. 
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IV.  BATTERED WOMEN SELF-DEFENSE 
This might be my favorite single class of the semester.  I only give the 
“battered woman” materials one class session,45 but I find that the discussion 
stretches on outside of class, among students themselves and in the hallways 
and my office for days thereafter.46  This is a class where I want students to 
think about why we justify self-defensive killings, and it is another good place 
to get students considering the importance of the justification/excuse 
distinction.  Most especially, this is a place for students to consider feminist 
challenges to self-defense law as it has developed.  As with provocation law, I 
believe the feminist challenges are important for what they show us about 
criminal law doctrine; I also believe that the most extreme position taken by 
some feminists—that battered women are justified in killing sleeping 
abusers—should be rejected. 
By the time we reach the battered women materials, students have learned 
the basics of self-defense.  Relevant to current discussion, they know that there 
is an imminency requirement, but they also understand that the defense can be 
based on a reasonable, yet inaccurate, belief that deadly force is necessary to 
combat a supposed imminent attack.  However, in teaching basic self-defense, 
when I try to get students to tell me why—precisely why—killing a lethal 
aggressor in self-defense is justified (and not merely excused), I usually have 
difficulty getting them to articulate what seems to them to be self-evident.  
Because one of my goals in the discussion of criminal law defenses is to get 
my class to tackle that deeper question—why is killing another human being 
ever justifiable?—and to see that there are both potential utilitarian and non-
consequentialist moral answers to the question,47 I carry this question along to 
State v. Norman,48 the best battered-woman case I have found to date.  Here, 
students do provide answers, albeit conflicting ones, to the why-is-killing-in-
self-defense-justifiable question. 
 
 45. Ideally, I spend seventy-five minutes on the subject of battered women.  In the past, I 
was often able to have my three-unit criminal law class scheduled twice a week, which allowed 
seventy-five minutes per session.  These days at Ohio State, I teach my four-unit class three days 
a week, which works out to seventy-minute sessions. 
 46. I also am a high-level user of The West Educational Network (TWEN) in my Criminal 
Law classes.  TWEN or its LEXIS counterpart is a topic all of its own.  (If you would like to look 
in on my TWEN activities in Criminal Law, let me know.)  However, two of the “forums” I have 
are “Dressler’s Musings” (in which I start a conversation on a subject from class and students 
respond to me and each other) and “Student Musings” (in which students start their own criminal 
law conversation unregulated by me), and discussion of battered women often continues there. 
 47. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.02 (3d ed. 2001) 
(“Underlying Theories of ‘Justification’”). 
 48. 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (overturning Norman’s manslaughter conviction), 
rev’d, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (reinstating the conviction).  Students read both opinions. 
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Norman involves awful facts.  Defendant Judy Norman and her husband 
J.T. were married twenty-five years, with four children, at the time of the 
homicide.49  J.T. was an alcoholic who began beating his wife five years after 
their wedding.50  According to the court: 
  [J.T.] Norman, himself, had worked one day a few months prior to his 
death; but aside from that one day, witnesses could not remember his ever 
working.  Over the years and up to the time of his death, Norman forced 
defendant to prostitute herself every day in order to support him.  If she begged 
him not to make her go, he slapped her.  Norman required defendant to make a 
minimum of one hundred dollars per day; if she failed to make this minimum, 
he would beat her. 
  Norman commonly called defendant  “Dogs,” “Bitches,” and “Whores,” 
and referred to her as a dog.  Norman beat defendant “most every day,” 
especially when he was drunk and when other people were around, to “show 
off.”  He would beat defendant with whatever was handy—his fist, a fly 
swatter, a baseball bat, his shoe, or a bottle; he put out cigarettes on 
defendant’s skin; he threw food and drink in her face and refused to let her eat 
for days at a time; and he threw glasses, ashtrays, and beer bottles at her and 
once smashed a glass in her face.  Defendant exhibited to the jury scars on her 
face from these incidents.  Norman would often make defendant bark like a 
dog, and if she refused, he would beat her.  He often forced defendant to sleep 
on the concrete floor of their home and on several occasions forced her to eat 
dog or cat food out of the dog or cat bowl. 
  Norman often stated both to defendant and to others that he would kill 
defendant.  He also threatened to cut her heart out.51 
As for the homicide itself, during the two days preceding the killing, Judy 
was subjected to J.T.’s usual treatment, but perhaps it was worse even by 
previous standards: J.T. slapped Judy, threw a bottle at her, smeared food on 
her face, burnt her with a cigarette, and threatened to “cut her breast off and 
shove it up her rear end.”52  During J.T.’s last day on this earth, the police were 
called three times, although they only arrived twice.53  The first time, an officer 
advised Judy to file a complaint against her husband, but she explained that he 
would kill her if she did that.54  The second visit occurred after Judy took an 
overdose of “nerve pills.”55  Sometime later, Judy decided to take matters into 
her own hands: she went to her mother’s house, obtained a gun, and shot her 
 
 49. Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 587. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 588 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 588. 
 55. Id. 
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husband while he slept.56  At trial, Judy claimed self-defense.57  Because she 
could hardly claim that an actual imminent threat on her life existed—a 
sleeping man is not an instantaneous threat—she supplemented her case with 
expert testimony that she suffered from battered woman syndrome.58  
Apparently this evidence was intended to show, among other matters, that as a 
battered woman with the syndrome she could reasonably have believed that 
J.T. represented an imminent threat.  The trial judge, however, refused to 
instruct the jury on self-defense.59 
Students come primed to discuss battered woman syndrome, but I don’t let 
them start there.  I ask them to ignore the syndrome testimony, but to accept all 
of the other facts, including (of course) that Judy Norman had been beaten and 
degraded by her husband for years, including the hours immediately preceding 
the homicide.  I ask students whether Judy Norman had a valid common law 
self-defense claim on those facts (the answer is no).  I ask the same question 
under the Model Penal Code (probably no).  I then ask, should the law justify 
what Judy Norman did.  And now the discussion breaks open into a wonderful 
flurry of yes-and-no responses.  There are males and females on both sides of 
the discussion.  Students who would justify the killing—and sometimes I have 
to remind them that they must ignore the syndrome evidence—come up with 
various arguments, and almost always I can show them how their answers fit 
one or another of the moral theories of justification I have asked them to 
consider. 
Perhaps the most common explanation I get is, in essence, that Norman 
forfeited his right to life by his horrendous conduct.  I ask those students 
whether, if this is so, they would justify the homicide if Judy asked a brother to 
commit the killing.  If J.T. has forfeited his right to life—if his death does not 
constitute a social harm—then it shouldn’t matter, should it, if her brother does 
the killing?  What if Judy hired a contract killer to commit the crime?  Now 
some students begin to rethink their position, or they seek to provide a 
principled way to distinguish a homicide by Judy (or, perhaps, her brother) 
from the contract killer.  I also ask: What if just before she planned to kill J.T., 
he had suffered a debilitating stroke and no longer represented a threat to her 
life?  Many of the “forfeiture” students would not justify the killing now.  I try 
to show them that this would mean that the underlying justification for the 
homicide really has less to do with forfeiture and more to do with either 
utilitarian concerns of Judy’s safety or moral claims based on Judy’s right of 
autonomy.  From here we proceed to discuss those and other possible reasons 
to justify the homicide, and I open up discussion to be sure that critics of 
 
 56. Id. at 589. 
 57. Id. at 587. 
 58. Id. at 589. 
 59. Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 587. 
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justifying the homicide get their full opportunity to explain why killing J.T. as 
he slept should not be authorized by the law. 
The discussion is, almost without exception, wonderful.  The discussion 
allows us to flesh out the various theories of justification that can explain the 
defense of self-protection and they can see that if one takes a particular moral 
theory and applies it to a specific case or class of cases, this can help them 
(and, presumably, thoughtful lawmakers) decide how broadly or narrowly the 
self-defense privilege should be drawn.  They see a reason to care about the 
“abstract” moral theories I have put in their way. 
Inevitably during the free-wheeling discussion some students will either 
explicitly argue that we should excuse, not justify, Judy Norman, or they make 
an argument for justification that really sounds in excuse (“protecting yourself 
is instinctual”).60  Perhaps when this happens, or later, I bring syndrome 
evidence back into the discussion and ask whether such evidence really helps 
support a justification claim or whether, instead, it has the unintentional effect 
of pathologizing Judy Norman and her claim, thus converting the case more to 
an excuse.  In turn, this allows me to get students thinking about whether it is 
better policy—or makes any real difference—whether we justify or merely 
excuse Judy Norman.  Students pretty clearly see that it does matter on a policy 
level (some feel that it is important to send a message of support for battered 
women through justification reasoning, while others feel that it is better for the 
law not to promote or authorize non-confrontational killings). 
As one final effort to have students appreciate the justification/excuse 
distinction, I ask them then to think about one of the first publicized battered 
woman cases, the so-called “burning bed” case in which a battered wife poured 
gasoline over her sleeping husband and lit a match.61  What if he had 
awakened, smelled the gasoline, observed his wife with the match, and put two 
and two together and came up with four?  Would he be justified in killing her 
with his trusty gun under the pillow?  Students’ eyes light up with recognition 
of the problem: if self-defense is limited to the use of force against unlawful 
threats, and if the battered woman is justified in killing her husband, then she 
represents a lawful threat to him.  Ergo, he would not be justified in protecting 
himself with the gun.  But, if she is only excused for killing him, then she does 
represent an unlawful threat to him, and he would be justified in killing her.  
Thus, the label of her conduct potentially matters. 
Of course, Norman permits full discussion of feminist concerns about the 
protection of battered women.  In very recent years this discussion has allowed 
 
 60. Some students, of course, favor the outcome in Norman, i.e., conviction for some form 
of criminal homicide.  I make sure their views are heard, indeed, often early on in the discussion, 
so as to force students who would acquit the defendant to defend their position against the 
prevailing law. 
 61. FAITH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980). 
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me the opportunity to test out my own approach to the issue, one that would 
only excuse, not justify, some (not all) homicides in Norman-like cases, but 
one that would not be linked to excuse-sounding syndrome claims.62  The case 
also allows students to consider the arguments of some feminists that self-
defense law itself, independent of the battered women issue, is based on a 
male-on-male combat model, and thus that various features of the defense—
most especially, the imminency requirement and the idea that use of a weapon 
to respond to an unarmed threat represents disproportional punishment—
should be reconsidered.  However one comes out on these issues, the 
discussion gives credence to the importance of considering, if not inevitably 
accepting, feminist (and, thus, by implication, other “outsider”) theories. 
V.  RAPE LAW 
A. Some Preliminary Comments 
There is a fair amount of literature on the subject of teaching rape 
materials,63 and no small amount of it has focused on whether the rewards (to 
students) of teaching rape law outweigh its risks (to teachers).  At least one 
professor expressed published doubt that, in light of his teaching experiences, 
he would teach it again.64  In my own situation, there have been incentives to 
downplay the subject: I was told by one professor (who might represent a 
silent, but significant minority) that he would never use my casebook—or any 
other casebook, for that matter— if it even included a chapter on rape;65 a fist 
fight once broke out outside my classroom, after a class on rape;66 I have been 
 
 62. See Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: Reflections 
on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW 
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) 
(arguing for a duress-like excuse claim). 
 63. E.g., Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1995); Susan 
Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509 (1992); Kevin C. McMunigal, Reducing the 
Risks and Realizing the Rewards: An Approach to Teaching Rape Law, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
519 (1997); James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE 
L.J. 481 (1992). 
 64. Tomkovicz, supra note 63, at 506.  Professor Tomkovicz recently informed me that 
notwithstanding his earlier doubts, he continues to teach rape law, “with much success, I think.  
At least no negative episodes or feedback of any sort.  I am committed to keeping it in the 
course.”  E-mail from James Tomkovicz to Joshua Dressler (Apr. 29, 2003) (on file with author). 
 65. This professor explained that he did not want to teach any materials on rape.  I am not 
sure if he told me why, but my sense was that the subject simply made him uncomfortable.  I 
suggested that he could always skip the chapter on rape, but he said that if he did this, “some of 
my students would complain.”  He explained that if there were no rape chapter to delete, students 
would not blame him for omitting the subject. 
 66. The fight broke out between two male students.  One of them, who had always struck me 
in class as a bit of a “frat boy,” had made a comment in class that another student, whose sister 
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criticized by students for being too directive in the class discussion, and I have 
been criticized by students for not controlling class discussion enough.67 
So, am I masochist to say that the rape law materials provide some of my 
favorite teaching experiences?  I hope not.  But, I must concede at the outset 
that I would not feel quite as I do if I were teaching the subject at some law 
schools,68 or if I were an untenured faculty member at an institution in which 
 
had once been raped, interpreted as making light of the subject.  I had not thought that Frat Boy’s 
comment on rape was extreme; I suspect, therefore, that there was more to the story than this 
single class comment.  I could easily imagine that Frat Boy made more than his share of 
immature comments outside the classroom on a number of topics.  This was just the final straw 
for the aggrieved student. 
 67. After the fistfight, some students blamed me for not having predicted potential problems.  
These critics thought I should have said or done something early on to prevent the violence.  The 
year after the fistfight, I decided to make some comments at the start of the rape chapter in the 
hope that my words would prevent joking or other trivialization of the subject.  The difficulty 
with this—and the basis for the new criticism I received from a number of students following my 
comments—was that my remarks chilled free expression and treated them like children.  (Of 
course, although I did not say this, my comments had been inspired by a childish school brawl.)  I 
cannot say for sure, of course, whether my comments had the deleterious impact my critics 
claimed, but I concede that class discussion that year seemed more constrained.  I want students 
to feel comfortable making thoughtful, unpopular comments on any subject, including rape law, 
and my decision to issue a warning apparently constituted overkill. 
  I no longer make any special comments at the outset, and I have had no further problems 
in the classroom that would have even remotely justified “a speech.”  I have concluded that, at 
least in the law schools at which I have taught, students willing to openly express adolescent 
“rape is funny” comments are now rare (a victory of feminism).  See infra note 80.  I also believe 
that a professor, simply by his or her natural control of the classroom, and by the seriousness that 
he or she brings to the subject, can reduce the risk of inappropriate student remarks nearly to zero. 
  This does not mean, however, that there won’t ever be offense taken, hurt feelings felt, 
or emotions frayed.  Some students feel so strongly about the subject that they cannot easily 
accept comments with which they disagree, and there will be students who have been sexually 
assaulted or the victims of attempted assault, who may find class discussion traumatic.  In my 
mind, the former students should not be placated; the latter students need to have their concerns 
handled with care and consideration.  Sexual assault victims need to realize that there might be an 
examination essay question dealing with rape, and thus they need to get whatever help is needed 
(for example, through student counseling services) to prepare for this, but in the interim I have 
always been prepared to let such students “have a pass” in the classroom on the subject, and even 
to leave the room if needed. 
 68. I prefer not to get into specifics, but I found the atmosphere at one law school 
unconducive to pleasant teaching of rape law because too many students were intolerant of 
opposing views.  Their rigidity to alternative ideas, expressed with considerable passion, deterred 
many students who disagreed with them from talking.  This was not a symptom of just one group 
of students; it happened in more than one semester.  This had little to do, really, with the rape 
materials; it was present much of the semester and involved a dynamic that extended beyond my 
classroom (indeed, throughout the law school) at the time.  Having said this, I would still teach 
the rape materials if I were teaching at that law school, even if I thought that this same dynamic 
would be present, but I would probably be unable to say that teaching the materials was fun. 
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my career depended on sterling teaching evaluations69 or, simply, if I were the 
type of teacher who strives to avoid all possibilities of classroom friction.  I 
also believe that a professor’s gender has an impact: at least subliminally, all 
else equal, female students will start with more positive expectations about 
class discussion of rape with a female professor, and men may feel more 
comfortable with a male teacher.70  For me, by the time we reach the rape 
materials midway through the semester, my reputation with students provides 
some immunity: female students, and feminists in particular, see me as 
relatively open to their ideas; but, students have also seen that I reject some 
feminist solutions in regard to provocation and battered women, so I am not 
seen as falling into any particular camp.  If I were seen by students, rightly or 
not, as a rigid feminist or anti-feminist, I would not find teaching the rape 
materials “among my favorite teaching experiences.”  I would still teach the 
subject, because the topic is too important and pedagogically valuable to avoid, 
but I would not do so with as much gusto as I do now. 
B. Teaching the Subject 
On average I spend four sessions on rape, covering most, but not all,71 of 
my own casebook materials.  Early on,72 I use a non-traditional means to delve 
 
 69. Although I greatly value teaching, I have always disagreed with those who put much 
stock in student evaluation forms as a factor in the tenuring process.  (I prefer serious yearly peer 
evaluation.)  Although in extreme cases student forms might red flag a serious teaching problem 
(although, an attentive dean is likely to be aware of the problem anyway, as a result of individual 
and repeated student complaints brought to her office), such evaluative data can have the 
unfortunate effect of rewarding professors who try to please students rather than to challenge 
them. 
 70. I once read a “rape” fact pattern a law professor had put together for her examination.  I 
was struck by its graphic nature.  She received few, if any, complaints from her students.  In great 
part I am sure this is because students respected and trusted her good judgment, but I believe (as 
does she, based on recent conversations) that she was protected, at least a bit, by the fact that she 
is female. 
 71. Because of time constraints, I frequently omit the materials on fraudulent rape.  If I am 
falling behind schedule, very unhappily I also omit the rape-shield materials. 
 72. Before turning to the case materials, I start with some preliminaries.  I contrast the 
subject we just completed, which focused almost exclusively on the mens rea issues of dividing 
criminal homicide into different offenses and degrees, with the study of rape, which primarily 
focuses on the actus reus of the offense.  As I explain, rape law discussion involves drawing 
various dividing lines: between sexual conduct that does not justify the criminal sanction and 
conduct that merits the intervention of the criminal law; and another line distinguishing between 
criminal conduct justifying substantial penalties and that which does not. 
  I use some of the first class session to get students discussing what they perceive to be 
the underlying harm of rape.  In what way, if at all, is it any different than any other form of 
harmful or offensive bodily contact—why is rape, in other words, treated so much more harshly 
than battery?  This permits discussion of feminist and other explanations of the offense of rape.  
This discussion also ties in later to our conversation about the proper scope of a modern sexual 
assault statute. 
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into the doctrinal materials, using the Rusk case.73  My casebook includes the 
majority and dissenting opinions of both the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals, which overturned the defendant’s conviction, and the Maryland Court 
of Appeals opinion, which reinstated the conviction.  This is a nice case 
because it lays out what might be characterized as a pre-reform, but hardly 
extreme, version of traditional rape law.  I teach it through role-playing, a 
method I am now convinced frees the entire class to talk more openly 
throughout the rape chapter materials.  It is also, simply, a nice change of pace 
for everyone. 
A week before we get to Rusk, I assign one student to serve as the 
prosecuting attorney, and another as defense counsel.74  I always select a 
female to serve as defense counsel, and a male to be prosecutor.  If I know 
enough about my students by this time, which I almost always do, I try to pick 
those who will be compelled to defend propositions with which they probably 
initially disagree.  The lawyers are instructed to prepare closing arguments to 
the jury in the Rusk case, using the facts and law set out in the opinions.75  On 
the day of the trial or perhaps before, I select six students, three males and 
three females, to serve as jurors.  I am the trial judge, whose role simply is to 
instruct the jury on Maryland law (which comes directly from the case) and on 
the presumption of innocence. 
In our mock trial, the “attorneys” give their closing arguments.  By having 
the students role play this way, I free them to make arguments that they might 
not personally believe, or that they might believe but that they might not 
otherwise express because of class social pressures.  I briefly instruct the 
jury,76 after which deliberations occur in front of the other students.77  After 
 
  I also raise briefly for discussion the arguments of a few feminist commentators that 
acquaintance rape might be better deterred through civil suits than criminal prosecutions, or that it 
is an offense better suited for non-incarcerative remedies.  Finally, students also read brief 
excerpts of the experiences of feminist criminal defense attorneys, who describe the tensions they 
feel in rape cases given their feminist values and potentially conflicting ethical responsibilities to 
their clients.  Some students have told me they appreciated the latter materials because it 
legitimated their own conflicting feelings. 
 73. Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (reversing a conviction for rape), 
rev’d, State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981) (reinstating the conviction). 
  In the first two editions of my casebook, Rusk was the first substantive case in the rape 
chapter, followed by State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).  In the third edition, I reversed 
the order of these cases, and thus I start with Alston, which I cover in a traditional (Socratic) 
manner as part of the first class session preliminaries.  See supra note 72.  I then turn to Rusk on 
day two. 
 74. Approximately two weeks before the Rusk case, I tell my class of my role-playing plans 
and seek volunteers to serve as attorneys.  I get enough names to make a careful choice. 
 75. One nice feature of Rusk is that there is little disagreement about the then-applicable law 
or of the basic facts of the alleged assault.  The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to 
convict. 
 76. I sometimes select a foreperson. 
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suitable time for deliberations, I ask the jury to vote.  In the seven years I have 
taught Rusk this way, at four law schools, I have never had a unanimous 
verdict.  In four of the trials, the vote was 3-3, and in the others it was 4-2 for 
conviction. 
With the role-playing completed, I resume teaching by providing my 
observations of the students’ performances and then opening up discussion of 
the case to the entire class.  There is such a high class response that we never 
finish in the allotted time, so I sometimes set this class up at a special hour 
when we can run the class beyond its normal length, and even then students 
carry on conversation with each other and me after class.78 
Rusk works beautifully on many levels.  First, a few students have the 
opportunity to get a slight taste of what it is like to argue a matter to a jury.  In 
that regard, I always ask the student attorneys during the full-class discussion 
whether they felt comfortable with the side assigned to them when they first 
read Rusk.  Far more often that not, they tell me they were not happy—as a 
matter of personal predilection79 or because they felt they were assigned the 
losing legal side.  However, with just one exception in all of these years, the 
student attorneys stated that by the day of trial they were convinced their 
arguments for conviction or acquittal were the “right” ones.  This is a chance 
for students to learn a little about the psychology of being an advocate, 
including the effects of cognitive dissonance. 
The jurors, and perhaps the class as a whole, benefit from the deliberative 
process.  It brings home to some students what they already realized more 
abstractly, namely, that a lawyer’s argumentation can affect the outcome 
regardless of the facts.  And, perhaps most demonstrably, the jurors focus a lot 
on the instruction I give them on the presumption of innocence.  The class gets 
a chance to see how that presumption affects deliberations; they see as well 
how student jurors can differ so much in terms of what constitutes 
 
 77. If you decide to follow this approach, think about the best way to physically structure the 
role-playing.  The most difficult issue is where to place the jurors.  You will want the lawyers to 
have eye contact with them during closing arguments, but you also need the jurors to be situated 
so that their deliberations can be heard by the rest of the class.  I have taught in classrooms that 
are small enough, with good enough acoustics, to make this fairly easy; most classrooms, 
however, do not lend themselves to an easy set-up.  (On one occasion I reserved the Moot Court 
room for this class session.)  In the worst case scenario, I suggest bringing in six chairs, and 
having three jurors seated facing the other three jurors in the front of the classroom, but with 
enough distance between the three-seat aisles that they naturally have to talk louder to be heard 
by the other jurors, so that the rest of the class also hears adequately.  Even so, you should remind 
the jurors to keep their voices up so they can be heard in the back of the classroom. 
 78. I don’t believe the role-playing works well when limited to an hour or less.  Ideally, you 
ought to give the attorneys fifteen minutes for their arguments (ten minutes would be the very 
least they will need); then you would give jurors fifteen minutes for deliberation; the remaining 
time would be used for full-class discussion. 
 79. Remember: I assigned a female to defend the accused rapist, and a male to prosecute. 
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“reasonable” doubt.  And, the best students often notice how jurors—even law 
students—sometimes ignore or misunderstand jury instructions. 
What is also great about Rusk is that in every trial there have been both 
males and females voting to acquit, and to convict.  In short, this case not only 
isn’t a slam-dunk for either side, but because the jurors do not break down 
stereotypically (women to convict, men to acquit), the verdict essentially 
invites the class to speak their minds, less fearful of group (or gender) pressure, 
as we turn in the remaining rape law classes to such controversial topics as 
whether “no always means no” in sexual affairs, whether the criminal law 
should punish males who have intercourse with females who don’t say no but 
who also don’t say yes, whether the law should continue to recognize a 
“defense” of reasonable mistake of fact in rape cases, whether sexual assault 
law should expand beyond the area of forcible intercourse, and whether rape-
shield laws unfairly restrict the ability of a defendant to cross-examine his 
accuser and present his case for acquittal.80 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I love teaching.  I most especially love teaching Criminal Law.  After more 
than a quarter century of teaching, I remain as excited about the subject as 
when I first entered the classroom. The course allows law teachers to do 
everything we would hope to do in a first-year class: teach doctrine and 
statutory analysis, consider moral and political theory, demonstrate the value 
of interdisciplinary research, and, not the least of which, provoke students to 
wrestle with some of the deepest—and most ancient—issues we ever can hope 
to confront in a law school classroom or elsewhere. 
I hope this essay, more than simply providing readers with some perhaps 
useful pedagogical suggestions, will inspire new (and, indeed, experienced) 
members of the legal academy to choose Criminal Law as “their subject” for 
teaching and serious scholarship. 
 
 
 80. For what it is worth, in the last three or four years of teaching rape law, I have found that 
the divisions between male and female students in class are not nearly as bright as in the more 
distant past.  That is, more men are now sympathetic to feminist goals (or, at least, to law 
enforcement goals generally), and an increasing number of women reject the most expansive 
feminist arguments in the field.  I cannot be sure, of course, if my experiences are random, but my 
observations are based on teaching in the last four years in California, Michigan, and Ohio, in 
public (Berkeley, Michigan, and Ohio State) and private (McGeorge) law schools. 
